Introduction
A wrongful life action is one brought by or on behalf of a child (usually deformed) (1) against the defendant, claiming that because of the negligence of the defendant he or she has to endure a deformed and unhappy existence. The child in a wrongful life claim does not allege that the defendant's negligence caused his or her deformity. Rather, the child alleges that the defendant's negligence, in failing adequately to inform the parents of the risk of a deformed birth, caused his or her birth. That is, had there been no negligence, the child would not have been born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to the deformity. In other words, he or she would have been better off not being born.
Usually, a wrongful life action is brought in conjunction with a wrongful birth claim. This latter claim consists of parents alleging that, had the defendant not been negligent, they would either have avoided conception or terminated the pregnancy. Here the parents are claiming damages to compensate them for the added financial and emotional costs of having and rearing a child (2) .
The relative novelty of all these birth-related claims reflects the fact that a new set of responsibilities is being placed on the medical profession as prenatal care becomes more advanced. This advancement in prenatal care means that it is possible for parents to choose whether to denied the opportunity to make an informed choice as to whether to have a child, or to prevent the birth of a child, our sense of justice would demand that some kind of compensation be given to the injured parties as a recognition that a wrong had been done. Such compensation would, as in all actions of this sort, be designed to restore the plaintiffs, as far as possible, to the situation they would have been in had there been no negligence. Indeed, courts have accepted parents' claims (2) .
Wrongful life claims, however, have consistently been rejected by the American courts (3), although recently, there have been signs of change in the American judicial approach towards wrongful life (4). In Britain, however, one can deduce from the only case on wrongful life that judges are utilising the reasonings expressed in past American cases to exclude this type of claim (5).
The aim of this article is to examine some of the reasonings courts have used to reject wrongful life claims. Although most of them are rather unconvincing, there are, perhaps, justifiable reasons which, though not clearly expressed by the courts, operate against judicial recognition of such a claim.
History of wrongful life cases
'Wrongful life' claims were first brought in the USA by two illegitimate, healthy children. They are now usually referred to as 'dissatisfied life' rather than wrongful life cases. However, the reasonings in these cases have become the basis for later 'true' wrongful life claims.
In the case of Zepeda v Zepeda (6), a healthy illegitimate child brought an action against his father, claiming injury by virtue of his illegitimate status. The court rejected the claim, one of its reasonings being fear of a flood of litigation.
In 1966, a New York court followed this decision in Williams v State of New York (7). In this case, a child filed a claim against the State for negligently failing to prevent the sexual assault on her institutionalised mother that resulted in her illegitimate birth. The court rejected the claim holding that ' [being] born under one set of circumstances rather than another . . . is not a suable wrong that is cognisable in court' (8).
The first true wrongful life claim was considered in Gleitman v Cosgrove (9). The plaintiff child was born with defects in sight, hearing and speech after the defendant doctors negligently assured his mother that he would not be harmed by her having contracted rubella (German Measles) in the first trimester of pregnancy. The court recognised that the doctors' conduct did not cause the child's defects. Indeed, they were caused by something over which the doctors had no control. The complaint of the plaintiff, therefore, was not that he should not have been born without defects but that he should not have been born at all. That is, had the mother been informed of the possibility of bearing a child with these defects, the pregnancy would have been terminated and the plaintiffs deformed existence prevented. This claim was again rejected (10).
McKay v Essex Area Health Authority
There is only one English case on wrongful life and it is on all fours to Gleitman. In McKay v Essex Area Health Authority (11), the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the duty owed to an unborn child was a duty not to injure it. The child had been injured by the infection but not by the defendants. If the child's action were to succeed, it could only do so on the basis of a right not to be born deformed, which in the case of a child deformed before birth by nature or disease meant a right to be aborted (12). Although the doctor owed a duty to the mother to advise her of the infection and of the advisability or desirability of an abortion, it did not follow that the doctor was under a legal obligation to the fetus to terminate its life or that a fetus had a right to die. Such a claim for 'wrongful life' would be contrary to public policy as a violation of the sanctity of human life. Furthermore, the court said that it would be impossible for it to evaluate damages by comparing the value of nonexistence with existence in a disabled state.
The 
Reasonings of the courts
The vital element of a wrongful life action is that life itself is an injury and that the defendant's negligence caused the birth and thus the injury. Courts have on the whole rejected wrongful life claims for various reasons.
Can existence be an injury?
First, it has been said that a wrongful life action must fail because existence, albeit with defects, can never be an injury cognisable at law. Thus it has been said that:
'Life -whether experienced with or without a major physical handicap -is more precious than non-life' (18).
Yet it is too rigid to lay down as a matter of principle and substantive law that life with deformities can never be worse than non-life, and that causing someone to be alive with defects can never be an injury to that person. Thus, it has been said that:
'If a court had to decide whether it were better to enter into life maimed or halt than not to enter it at all, it would, I think, be bound to say it was better in all cases of mental or physical disability, except possibly in those extreme cases . .
.' (19).
A case that nearly demonstrated that there might be circumstances in which life may be worse than non-life is Re B (a Minor) (20). A child was born suffering from Down's Syndrome and an intestinal blockage. An operation was required to relieve the obstruction if she was to live for more than a few days. Since the effect of the operation might be that the child would have the normal life-span of a Down's Syndrome person, the court made an order that the operation should be performed. However, Templeman L J said that:
'There may be cases, I know not, of severe proved damage where the future is so certain and where the life of the child is so bound to be full of pain and suffering that the court might be driven to a different conclusion' (21).
The court's pronouncement that life with defects can never be an injury cognisable at law reflects not only its rigid view on the principle of the sanctity of human life, but also its insensitivity to current debates on quality of life, voluntary euthanasia, non-treatment of severely malformed infants and the terminally-ill, and selective abortion of the congenital deformed (22). Implicit in these debates is the idea that under certain circumstances, life can be worse than non-life. In other words, a comparison seems to be intuitively possible.
In the case of Re Quinlan (23), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a patient could decline medical treatment under certain circumstances even
), a severely retarded adult was afflicted with leukaemia. Evidence indicated that chemotherapy would produce only a temporary remission; moreover, the treatment would produce adverse side-effects. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision that it would not be in the patient's interests to prolong his life.
Although the above two cases involve judgements that existence is not always better than death, such judgements are essentially identical in nature to that where one expresses the view that one would have been better off not having been born. Death or nonexistence is non-life. Cases of termination of life, therefore, demonstrate that there is no immutable rule to the effect that life is always to be preferred over non-life. Hence one can conclude that under certain (limited) circumstances (26), non-life can be better than life and existence can be an injury.
Can damages be assessed?
In addition to the claim by the courts that life is always better than non-life, and therefore, life with defects can never be an injury cognisable in law, the courts have also maintained that it will be impossible to measure damages because it will mean comparing between existence with deformities, on the one hand, and 'the utter void of non-existence' (27), on the other hand. Since man knows nothing about the latter, no comparison is possible. Thus 
Public policy against recognition of wrongful life
On a number of occasions, it has been said (33) that it is against public policy (upholding the principle of sanctity of human life) for the court to recognise that non-life can be better than life.
Public policy affirming the value of life is not absolute (34) . There are, indeed, accepted practices to prevent certain lives from coming into existence. The popular use of various contraceptive devices, legal abortions and sterilisations demonstrates that not all potential lives are considered desirable (35) . However, recognition of a wrongful life claim, once a child is born, is slightly different from accepting the desirability of avoiding certain lives coming into existence. Indeed, there may be valid reasons why the English and American courts, in general (36) , are unwilling to recognise that non-life can be better than life.
On the one hand, recognition of wrongful life would be consistent with interests of future children. It accepts that where medical knowledge and technology permit, a child should not be born to suffer extreme pain and suffering that could have been avoided but for someone's negligence. Thus, some American judges have talked about a 'fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole functional human being' in wrongful life cases (37).
On the other hand, what will be the logical consequences of accepting wrongful life claims (38) ? First, it may cast the burden to abort defective fetuses on pregnant women (39) . This is possible ifthe medical profession always give a warning to a pregnant woman that the child may be born deformed. However, it must be said that this manoeuvre by the medical profession will hardly be considered acceptable.
Second, it has been suggested that if a defendant doctor is found to be negligent in treating a particular patient, other doctors would practise defensive medicine (40) . If this means that doctors practising medicine in the same negligent manner as the defendant doctor will change their practice in light of the court's judgement, this will only be in patients' interests (41) . A negligent finding, however, should have no effect on those whose standard of practice is being upheld by the court. Accepting wrongful life claims may, however, affect attitudes of doctors who may be more inclined to advise an abortion in cases where a child may be born deformed (42). That may be one of the public policy reasons against recognising wrongful life.
Third, would accepting wrongful life claims mean that a doctor or a mother (43) would have a duty to abort defective fetuses even if they were opposed to abortion? Compulsory abortion would be incompatible with a woman's reproductive freedom (44) . From the doctors' point of view, this will be inconsistent with the conscious objection clause in the Abortion Act (45) . Further, a duty to abort may be unacceptable as it resembles too much the idea of negative eugenics, that is, certain defective lives should be eliminated (46 
